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ON COMPETENCE, LEGITIMACY, AND PROPORTIONALITY 
NANCY GERTNER† 
I asked Justice Aharon Barak, then president of the Israeli Su-
preme Court, why he considered himself competent to decide where 
the wall between Israel and the Palestinian territories should be locat-
ed and further, why it was legitimate for him, a judge, to do so.  The 
Israelis claimed that the wall was critical for the country’s security.  
The Palestinians insisted that the barrier violated international law by 
severely restricting the ability of Palestinians to travel freely and to ac-
cess work in Israel.  Justice Barak answered, “As a judge, I don’t pretend 
to know anything about security.  But I know about proportionality.  I 
know how to balance the security interests of the state against the rights 
of the Palestinians.”1  His response was not unusual for justices of  
 
†
Professor of Practice, Harvard Law School.  Former Judge, U.S. District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts (1994–2011). 
1 In Mara’abe v. Prime Minister, Justice Barak held that Israel, in balancing its security 
against the harm to the Palestinians, must adhere to a standard of proportionality, con-
sisting of three elements:  (1) “a rational link between the means employed and the 
goal,” (2) a demonstration that Israel has chosen the “least harmful means” to achieve 
its security objective, and (3) a showing that “the damage caused to the individual by 
the means employed . . . be of appropriate proportion to the benefit stemming from 
it.”  HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister 60(2) PD 477 para. 30 [2005] (Isr.), 
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/570/079/A14/04079570.a14.pdf; see also 
Geoffrey R. Watson, International Decisions, Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel, 100 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 895, 898 (2006) (“[T]he Court reiterated its holding . . . that Israel must 
balance its own security against the harm to Palestinians and that Israel must, in partic-
ular, adhere to a standard of ‘proportionality.’”).  
The Court concluded that the routing of a portion of Israel’s “security fence” in the 
northern West Bank violated international humanitarian law.  Mara’abe, 60(2) PD 477 
paras. 110-16.  Justice Barak has elaborated on his theory of judicial legitimacy in 
Aharon Barak, Foreword:  A Judge on Judging:  The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 100-04 (2002).  
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constitutional high courts in common law countries—except in the 
United States.  No other common law judge is likely to doubt his com-
petence to use proportionality analysis in any number of areas or the 
legitimacy of the approach.  Indeed, proportionality analysis has be-
come a critical part of international human rights adjudication.2 
While the use of proportionality analysis is widespread in constitu-
tional courts throughout the world, sentencing is an area in which it is 
perhaps the most critical and has the oldest pedigree.  Retributive 
theories of punishment use the proportionality principle to assign 
criminal blame; no offender should be punished more harshly than 
the crime deserves.3  Prior to mandatory sentencing guidelines and 
mandatory minimum sentencing, proportionality analysis was part of 
the sentencing judge’s toolkit in an individual case.4  In most common 
law countries with appellate review of sentencing, it was also the means 
by which appellate courts reviewed lower court sentences.5 To be sure, 
it was not a perfect approach and was hardly capable of mathematical 
precision, but it was accepted. 
Except in the United States.  Let me make a preliminary observa-
tion:  a common theme links the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence in which some Justices debate whether there is a consti-
tutional proportionality principle in noncapital sentencing at all; the 
federal appeals courts’ inability to give meaning to substantive reason-
ableness sentencing review even after United States v. Booker freed them 
to do so;6 and the United States Sentencing Commission’s inability to 
 
2 See Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitu-
tionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 147-48 (2008) (detailing the European Court 
of Human Rights’s turn to proportionality).  
3 ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE:  THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 66 (1976).  
To be sure, there is a range of retribution theories.  See Michael Tonry, Purposes and 
Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 16-23 (2006) (discussing the normative func-
tions of sentencing systems). 
4 KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:  SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN 
THE FEDERAL COURTS 14 (1998); see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 35 (2003) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In exercising their discretion, sentencing judges wisely em-
ployed a proportionality principle that took into account all of the justifications for 
punishment—namely, deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, and rehabilitation.” 
(citing STITH & CABRANES, supra, at 14)). 
5 See Richard G. Fox, Case Note, Ryan v. The Queen:  Paradox and Principle in Sen-
tencing a Paedophilic Priest:  Ryan’s Case in the High Court, 26 MELB. U. L. REV. 178, 188 
(2002) (discussing the application of proportionality to the sentencing of pedophiles); 
Arie Freiberg, Australia:  Exercising Discretion in Sentencing Policy and Practice, 22 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 204, 208, 211 & nn.49-50 (2010) (noting that courts in most parts of Aus-
tralia are required by statute to consider proportionality). 
6 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  
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rank offenses based on any coherent proportionality principle.  The 
theme (which I find quite troubling) is that proportionality analysis is 
simply not within the competence of the American judiciary.  Worse 
yet, it is not even within their legitimate role; it is somehow too policy-
centered, too “activist.”  It is a task best left to the legislature, or in the 
case of the federal sentencing guidelines, to an “independent” agency 
in the judicial branch the United States Sentencing Commission—but 
at all costs, not to the courts. 
The problem is that Congress has never applied a proportionality  
principle in enacting the substantive criminal laws; all efforts to enact 
a rational and proportional federal criminal code (along the lines of 
the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, for example) have 
failed.  Congress largely targets the “crime du jour,” increasing pun-
ishments not on the basis of proportionality analysis, but largely on the 
basis of public pressure.7  And, as I describe below, the “expert” agency, 
the Sentencing Commission, which had the resources and even the 
charge to apply such a principle, simply threw up its hands.  
It is no surprise, then, that over the course of my seventeen years 
on the federal bench the government regularly urged me to sentence 
a nonviolent crack offender to the same sentence as I would defend-
ants convicted of crimes like attempted sedition, solicitation to commit 
murder, kidnapping, abduction, and unlawful restraint.8  Or that the 
Court of Appeals overturned a decision in which I used empirical analy-
sis to try to make the punishment of a drug offender proportional to the 
punishment of other similarly situated dealers within Massachusetts.9  
 
7 See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 959, 966 (2009) (stating that legislators respond to the “crime du jour” to 
gain political credit even if the new legislation is redundant); Nancy Gertner, Sentencing 
Reform:  When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57 ME. L. REV. 570, 571, 573 (2005) (mentioning 
Congress’s attention to the “crime du jour” and failure to enact legislation that would 
provide consistency among sentences); Robert H. Joost, Federal Criminal Code Reform:  Is 
It Possible?, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 195, 202 (1997) (“The federal government has never 
enacted a true criminal code.”); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal 
Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 512-19, 529-33 (2001) (discussing redundancies in crimi-
nal codes that exist, in part, because of legislators’ incentives to pass criminal laws in 
response to public fear).  
8 E.g., United States v. Lacy, 99 F. Supp. 2d 108, 111-12 (D. Mass. 2000). 
9 See United States v. Thompson, 234 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that the 
proper approach in downward departure decisions is to compare any given defendant, 
regardless of the offense of which he has been convicted, to all defendants, and not 
those similarly situated with respect to the offense of conviction), vacating as moot 74 F. 
Supp. 2d 69, 71 (D. Mass. 1999) (using the presentence reports of fifty-four individuals 
sentenced for crack offenses in the same district and during the same time period as 
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Or that it finally took Booker to permit judges to implement a de mini-
mus proportionality principle—that the sentences of one defendant 
should be proportional to that of codefendants in the same case.10 
It is beyond the scope of this Essay to understand in any depth 
what it is about the American judiciary or American judicial traditions 
that makes proportionality analysis so much more problematic here 
than in other countries.  My purpose is descriptive.  I describe how the 
same problems that afflict constitutional proportionality analysis spill 
over into other arenas, to the appellate courts in ordinary sentencing 
appeals, and ultimately to the Sentencing Commission.  It is like an 
old comic strip, Alphonse and Gaston:  “After you, Alphonse,” says Gas-
ton.  Alphonse replies, “No, Gaston after you.”  Since neither will pro-
ceed before the other, they fail to get anything done.11  
While the Supreme Court has addressed the constitutional impli-
cations of sentencing issues when the issue is a binary one—life or 
death and life with or without parole—it has been unwilling to impose 
constitutional limits on scalable punishments—the length of time an 
individual may be constitutionally imprisoned for a crime.  The Court 
has concluded that the death penalty is disproportionately harsh for 
rape,12 for a crime committed when the defendant was under eight-
een,13 or for a mentally retarded individual.14  But where imprisonment 
is concerned, as Youngjae Lee noted, the Court’s decisions reflect a 
“meaningless muddle,” a “conceptual confusion” of “incoherent” ra-
tionales.15  According to a plurality of the Court in Ewing v. California, a 
sentence is not unconstitutionally excessive so long as it can be justi-
fied under any one of the traditional justifications of punishment16—
 
the defendant as a reference point to determine whether downward departure was 
appropriate). 
10 See Ryan Scott Reynolds, Equal Justice Under Law:  Post-Booker, Should Federal Judges 
Be Able to Depart from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Remedy Disparity Between Codefend-
ants’ Sentences?, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 538, 552-55 (2009) (finding that most circuits allow 
judges to consider codefendant disparity in sentencing).  
11 See, e.g., Frederick Burr Opper, You First, My Dear, WIKIMEDIA, http://upload. 
wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4b/Alphonsegaston.jpg (last visited Mar. 15, 
2012).  
12 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
13 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
14 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
15 Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 
677, 681, 684 (2005). 
16 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (plurality opinion).  It should be noted that in Ewing, no po-
sition had a majority other than the general holding that the punishment was constitu-
tionally valid.  The plurality opinion of Justice O’Connor was joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy.  Id. at 14. 
Gertner FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  4/21/2012 3:30 PM 
2012] On Competence, Legitimacy, and Proportionality 1589 
not a particularly high bar.  The plurality could find no overarching 
theory by which it could set limits on a legislature’s determination of 
imprisonment17 (although it had no such problem evaluating the ex-
cessiveness of punitive damages18).  Since the Constitution is not clear 
regarding the metes and bounds of “cruel and unusual punishment” 
as applied to imprisonment, the plurality implies that the Court lacks 
either the competence or the legitimacy to make the decision in most 
cases.  To choose one penological purpose and evaluate the sentence 
in reference to it would be to overstep the Court’s role.  Instead, the 
Court must defer to the legislature’s choices of punishments and the 
justifications for them.19  
In Ewing, for example, the Court held that a prison term of twenty-
five years to life under California’s three-strikes law was not excessive 
for the crime of shoplifting golf clubs worth $1200 by a repeat offender.20  
General, ill-defined notions of deterrence and incapacitation were 
sufficient to justify the law.  The Court noted that the recidivism stat-
ute “is nothing more than a societal decision that when such a person 
commits yet another felony, he should be subjected to the admittedly 
serious penalty of incarceration for life, subject only to the State’s 
judgment as to whether to grant him parole.”21   And the legislature is 
better suited to make “societal decisions” than the Court:  “[F]ederal 
courts should be reluctant to review legislatively mandated terms of 
imprisonment, and . . . successful challenges to the proportionality of 
particular sentences should be exceedingly rare.”22  Indeed, Justice 
 
17 For this proposition, the Court cited Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), which noted 
that the Constitution “does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory.”  
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25.   
18 While the Court is reluctant to address Eighth Amendment proportionality  
analysis in the context of imprisonment, it has no such problem with respect to puni-
tive damages.  See A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages:  The Error of 
Federal Excessiveness Jurisprudence, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1085, 1152 (2006) (“Beyond the 
historical and doctrinal difficulties with the Court’s excessiveness jurisprudence, one 
may marvel at how odd it is for the Court ardently to impose prohibitions against puni-
tive dollar awards beyond a certain amount while it freely permits states to imprison 
petty repeat offenders to life imprisonment.” (footnotes omitted)). 
19 The Ewing plurality noted:  “A sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as 
incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.  Some or all of these justifica-
tions may play a role in a State’s sentencing scheme.  Selecting the sentencing rationales 
is generally a policy choice to be made by state legislatures, not federal courts.”  Ewing, 
538 U.S. at 25 (citations omitted). 
20 Id. at 30. 
21 Id. at 21 (emphasis added) (quoting Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 278 (1980)). 
22 Id. at 22 (quoting Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982)).  
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Scalia, concurring in the judgment, was characteristically more em-
phatic:  The proportionality principle, unmasked, raises policy ques-
tions, not issues of law, and policy questions do not belong in courts.23 
It is ironic, however, that the Court in Ewing, and earlier in Solem v. 
Helm,24 did articulate an empirical, comparative approach that would 
have cabined the Court’s analysis, like the Court’s methodology in 
death penalty cases.  The Solem approach looks to three factors to de-
cide whether a sentence is so disproportionate that it violates the 
Eighth Amendment:  “(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness 
of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the 
same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of 
the same crime in other jurisdictions.”25  Factors (ii) and (iii) compose 
a comparative analysis that at the very least roots the Court’s evalua-
tion in concrete facts—how other jurisdictions punish the same crime 
and how the same jurisdiction punishes other crimes—much the same 
way an equal protection, rather than a substantive due process, ap-
proach does.26  Nevertheless, the plurality in Ewing refused to insist on 
this approach in all Eighth Amendment cases.  Rather, it held that the 
Eighth Amendment did not mandate a comparative analysis “within 
and between jurisdictions.”27   
Justice Stevens, in dissent, noted that the “absence of a black-letter 
rule does not disable” courts from determining the “outer limits on 
 
23 Justice Scalia offered, 
Perhaps the plurality should revise its terminology, so that what it reads into 
the Eighth Amendment is not the unstated proposition that all punishment 
should be reasonably proportionate to the gravity of the offense, but rather the 
unstated proposition that all punishment should reasonably pursue the multi-
ple purposes of the criminal law.  That formulation would make it clearer than 
ever, of course, that the plurality is not applying law but evaluating policy. 
Id. at 32 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  
24 463 U.S. 277 (1983).  
25 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 22 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 292).  
26 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, The Right to Privacy?, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 105, 
106-07 (noting that while there is some “indeterminacy” in equality claims that leaves 
room for judicial discretion, the degree of indeterminacy is greater in substantive due 
process doctrines such as the privacy doctrine because it “inappropriately requires 
judges to decide what is important in life”); see also Watkins v. U.S. Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 
1440 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he practical difficulties of defining the requirements im-
posed by equal protection, while not insignificant, do not involve the judiciary in the 
same degree of value-based line-drawing that the Supreme Court . . . found so trouble-
some in defining the contours of substantive due process.”), vacated and aff’d on other 
grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc). 
27 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23-24 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
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sentencing authority that the Eighth Amendment imposes.”28  Deter-
mining the “outer limits,” to Justice Stevens, was no different from 
identifying the kinds of lines American courts must draw in other situ-
ations.29  Indeed, what Justice Stevens did not say is that this kind of 
analysis is one in which high courts of other countries easily engage. 
 Justice Breyer’s dissent went one step further, demonstrating just 
how proportionality lines might be drawn.   First, using a traditional 
common law, case-by-case analysis, Justice Breyer situated Ewing’s sen-
tence relative to those imposed in other cases raising Eighth Amend-
ment challenges, noting that it was shorter than the defendant’s in 
Solem,30 but twice as long as that in an earlier case, Rummel v. Estelle.31  
Yet, nothing in the record justified the differential treatment.  Justice 
Breyer then turned to a comparative analysis, considering how this 
offense is treated in other state jurisdictions.32  Nevertheless, he could 
not persuade a majority of the Court that his approach was properly 
judicial—that is, grounded more in objective facts, than subjective  
policy preferences, well within the competence of the judiciary, and a 
legitimate exercise of the judicial role.   
Apart from Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the same “muddle” 
that Lee describes afflicting constitutional proportionality analysis33 
has also come to characterize American sentencing in the “ordinary” 
case.  Michael Tonry, using almost identical words as Lee, noted that 
sentencing policy is “fragmented,” and a “muddle” without any “widely 
shared understandings about what sentencing can or should accomplish 
or about conceptions of justice it should incorporate or reflect.”34   
 Prior to sentencing guidelines and mandatory sentencing rules, 
American judges navigated through this muddle during a sentencing 
 
28 Id. at 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
29 Id. at 33-34. 
30 Id. at 39 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 282).  In Solem, the  
defendant received life for writing a bad check.  463 U.S. at 281-82. 
31 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 39 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 
263, 266-68 (1980)).  In Rummel, the defendant received life with eligibility for parole 
at twelve years for felony theft.  445 U.S. at 266-67. 
32 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 42-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  As Lee noted, “comparative de-
sert” analysis is better suited for judicial enforcement than noncomparative desert.  Lee, 
supra note 15, at 716.  He outlines two kinds of “comparative desert” analysis.  The first is 
a type of overbreadth analysis that asks “whether the sentencing scheme sufficiently dis-
tinguishes among offenders of different levels of seriousness.”  Id.  The second inquiry 
“asks whether the punishment in question stands in appropriate relation to punishment 
for crimes that are as serious as, or more serious than, the crime at issue.”  Id. 
33 Lee, supra note 15, at 681. 
34 Tonry, supra note 3, at 1.  
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regime that has been described as the “indeterminate sentencing”  
period.35  Judges were the acknowledged experts in sentencing, with 
considerable discretion that they zealously guarded.36  “Indeed, judges 
believed that they were so skilled at sentencing that they resisted all 
efforts to restrict their discretion . . . . Sentencing discretion was cen-
tral to their work, a pillar of judicial independence.”37  Many judges 
were unalterably opposed to the Sentencing Guidelines and the Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 1984,38 testifying against it in Congress and even 
declaring the Act to be unconstitutional.39  
 To be sure, as I have written elsewhere, there were substantial 
problems with the indeterminate sentencing regime and its emphasis 
on judicial “expertise.”40  Judges did not receive training about how to 
exercise their discretion.  Law schools did not offer courses on the sub-
ject.  Professors taught criminal procedure as if there was nothing to 
study after the jury announced its verdict or the defendant pled guilty.  
And, unlike judges in other common law countries, federal judges 
successfully resisted appellate review of sentencing.41  Without appel-
late review, judges had little incentive to generate principles of sen-
tencing for future cases.  Few bothered to write sentencing opinions at 
 
35 Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence:  American Judges and Sentencing, 4 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 524 (2007). 
36 I have characterized this period in the following manner: 
During the indeterminate sentencing period, the principle purpose of sen-
tencing was rehabilitation.  And from that purpose flowed a different idea of 
who was an expert and different procedures to serve that expertise.  The judge 
was the “expert” in individualizing the sentence to reflect the goals of punish-
ment, including rehabilitation.  His or her role was essentially therapeutic, 
much like a physician.  Fundamentally different standards evolved between the 
trial stage and the sentencing stage, as befitting the very different roles of 
judges and juries.  The trial stage was the stage of rights, evidentiary rules, and 
high standards of proof.  In the sentencing stage, in contrast, the rules of evi-
dence did not apply; the standard of proof was the lowest in the criminal jus-
tice system, a fair preponderance of the evidence.  The approach made sense.  
You would no more limit the kind of information that a judge should receive 
in order to exercise his or her “clinical” sentencing role than you would limit 
the information available to a medical doctor in determining a diagnosis. 
Id. at 527 (footnote omitted). 
37 Id. at 524. 
38 Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified in scattered sections of 18 
and 28 U.S.C.). 
39 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 195-96 n.12 (noting that two hundred dis-
trict court judges held the Sentencing Reform Act unconstitutional prior to the Su-
preme Court’s upholding it in 1989).  
40 Gertner, supra note 7, at 571.  
41 Id. at 572. 
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all.42  As a result, while judges were supposed to be experts in sentenc-
ing and were certainly competent to assume that role with adequate 
support and training, their actual expertise was mythological.  
Congress did not help.  It proved incapable of rationalizing the 
federal criminal code, notwithstanding nearly twenty years of effort.43  
Whenever Congress added a new crime to the substantive criminal law, 
“there was little if any effort to reconcile new crimes and old ones or to 
order offenses according to their relative severity,”44 as some states had 
done when enacting the Model Penal Code.45 
In effect, the Sentencing Reform Act ceded the responsibility to 
make decisions about proportionality to an independent agency in the 
judicial branch, the United States Sentencing Commission.  The guide-
lines would be promulgated by an “expert” Commission, whose goal 
was to rationalize the sentencing rules, to bring to bear the latest sci-
entific studies in effectuating all of the purposes of punishment, and 
to do the kind of legwork determining the appropriate sentencing 
practices that Congress had been unable or unwilling to do.  And, in 
addition to its scientific studies about sentencing, the Commission 
would use the approach of “limited retribution” to set the maximum 
and minimum sentences for offenses and to rank punishments de-
pending on the characteristics of the offenses and offenders.  
While initially it was an open question whether the new experts 
would supplement or supplant the judges, over time, for reasons I have 
described elsewhere, the Sentencing Guidelines effectively became 
mandatory.46  The job of a judge became like that of a “clerk”47—to 
apply the Commission’s edicts, not to engage in a proportionality 
 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 573. 
44 Id. 
45 See Bibas, supra note 7, at 967 & n.26 (observing that the Model Penal Code was 
an effective force in motivating legislatures to rationalize their criminal codes). 
46 Gertner, supra note 35, at 529. 
47 In effect, American sentencing judges became the functional equivalent of civil 
code judges.  As John Merryman noted of the civil code system, 
The judge becomes a kind of expert clerk. . . . His function is merely to find 
the right legislative provision, couple it with the fact situation, and bless the so-
lution that is more or less automatically produced from the union.  The whole 
process of judicial decision is made to fit into the formal syllogism of scholastic 
logic.  The major premise is in the statute, the facts of the case furnish the minor 
premise, and the conclusion inevitably follows. 
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION:  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL 
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 36 (2d ed. 1985).  
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analysis of her own.  The task of appellate courts was to review whether 
the sentencing judge had correctly applied the Guidelines.48 
The Sentencing Commission, however, like Congress, failed to 
enact rational Guidelines and eschewed making any proportionality 
decisions.  The Commission did not engage in the “profoundly diffi-
cult” task of identifying sentencing purposes, electing instead “an em-
pirical approach that uses data estimating the existing sentencing 
system as a starting point,”49 but then increasing sentences willy nilly.  
Indeed, the Guidelines mirrored the patchwork quilt that had charac-
terized the federal substantive law.  For example, guidelines for drug 
crimes were much harsher than those for violent crimes,50 and guide-
lines for receiving child pornography could be higher than those for 
child abuse,51 violating proportionality norms and ultimately lacking 
consistency with the other purposes of sentencing.    
Significantly, after the Supreme Court brought an end to twenty 
years of mandatory federal sentencing guidelines by declaring them 
advisory in United States v. Booker, it became apparent that American 
judges had changed their attitudes towards sentencing.  Even in “ordi-
nary” sentencing—quite apart from cases involving constitutional 
analysis—many judges no longer believed they had the competence to 
deal with sentencing issues (using language which resonated with 
Justice Scalia’s concerns in Ewing).52  Indeed, many judges came to 
 
48 See Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 
265-67 (2009) (describing the initial ambiguity as to whether federal judges would crit-
ically evaluate the Guidelines or enforce them mechanically).  
49 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.1, pt. A, intro. ((“The Basic Approach”) 
policy statement) (1987). 
50 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
51 See, e.g., United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 187 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing the 
perverse result under the Guidelines that a first-time distributor of child pornography 
would receive a sentence of at least 168 to 210 months, while a person who had actually 
sexually assaulted a child would receive 151 to 188 months). 
52 See, e.g., United States v. Tabor, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1054 (D. Neb. 2005) (“I 
now decide that the crack Guidelines, like all other Guidelines, should be given heavy 
weight after Booker.”), aff’d, 439 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2006), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 1060 (2008).  
In Tabor, in a section entitled, “We Are Likely to Muck Things Up Even More if We Do 
Our Own Thing,” id. at 1060, Judge Kopf noted:   
Simply stated, unlike Congress or the Commission, we judges lack the institu-
tional capacity (and frankly, the personal competence) to set and then enforce 
one new, well-chosen, theoretically coherent, national standard.  As opposed 
to a uniform, albeit flawed, Guideline, it would make things far worse to have a 
bunch of different standards for crack sentencing.  For that reason alone, we 
should sit on our collective hands and give the crack Guidelines substantial or 
heavy weight until Congress decides otherwise. 
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believe that they were not competent to sentence at all, absent explicit 
rules promulgated by Congress or the Sentencing Commission.  Court 
after court insisted that the advisory Guidelines were entitled to con-
siderable, even presumptive, weight.53  As with the Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the implication was clear:  The political branches had 
greater expertise in this area than judges did.  It took several cases in 
which the Supreme Court effectively said “As to advisory guidelines—
we mean it!”54 in order to make clear that individual judges may con-
sider the Guidelines but are not bound by them.55  
After Booker, which charged the courts of appeals with reviewing 
sentencing decisions for procedural and substantive reasonableness, 
rather than only for compliance with the Guidelines,56 it became clear 
that circuit judges were still wandering through the same muddle 
about purposes and proportionality as had existed before the Guide-
lines.  For the most part, courts reviewed the guideline compliance 
and the procedural, not substantive, reasonableness of the decisions 
below.57  Substantive reasonableness foundered on the same shoals as 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  Rarely did circuit judges overturn 
sentences within the Guideline ranges. 
 
Id. at 1061. 
53 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 912 (D. Utah 2005) (con-
cluding that “considerable weight should be given to the Guidelines in determining 
what sentence to impose”). 
54 See Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009) (per curiam) (“The Guide-
lines are not only not mandatory on sentencing courts; they are also not to be presumed 
reasonable.”); Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 263-64 (2009) (per curiam) (stat-
ing that district courts can choose to depart from Guidelines “based on policy disagree-
ment with them”); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 90 (2007) (“[T]he 
Guidelines, formerly mandatory, now serve as one factor among several . . . .”); Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (observing that “the Guidelines are now adviso-
ry”); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 354 (2007) (explaining that Booker held uncon-
stitutional the aspects of the Guidelines that made them mandatory). 
55 See Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 YALE 
L.J. POCKET PART 137, 137 (2006), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/50.pdf 
(noting that simply “announcing that the Guidelines are advisory does not make them 
so,” and urging the appellate courts to critically evaluate Guideline sentences (empha-
sis omitted)). 
56 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 262-64 (2005). 
57 The courts’ approaches to sentencing appeals reflect the concerns raised by Wil-
liam Stuntz that our Constitution overprotects procedural rights and underprotects 
substantive rights.  WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
(2011).  But with “ordinary sentencing,” engaging with substantive concerns is una-
voidable.  Someone must make proportionality decisions, and after Booker, that “some-
one” is the judicial system. 
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The post-Booker world does not have to look like this.  Booker en-
courages scholars, judges, lawyers, and students to participate in a new, 
multilayered discussion about federal sentencing.  To make the Guide-
lines truly advisory, sentencing decisionmakers must identify alterna-
tive sentencing frameworks independent of the Guidelines and its 
policies.  While applying an alternative sentencing regime in cases with 
Eighth Amendment or other constitutional or federalism concerns may 
be difficult, no comparable problems exist in “ordinary” sentencing.   
I will close by noting that courts have a variety of tools at their dis-
posal in making sentencing decisions, tools that are capable of being 
applied to like cases.  Several of the lower courts have created a body 
of law that critically evaluates the Guidelines, exposing them to some-
thing akin to an administrative procedure review.58  With respect to 
some of the purposes of sentencing, rehabilitation, or deterrence, for 
example, judges can consider scientific studies in creating sentencing 
standards.  In addition to research concerning evidence-based practices, 
courts have the means to engage in meaningful comparative deserts 
analysis along the lines of Justice Breyer’s approach in Ewing.  Today, 
judges can study data on local and national sentencing patterns to un-
derstand where a given offender fits in the larger regional or national 
picture.59  The Sentencing Commission can become a repository of 
information about evidence-based practices and regional and national 
patterns, rather than simply the “Guideline police.” 
The absence of a coherent theory at this moment in the develop-
ment of sentencing law—Lee’s and Tonry’s muddle—could well lead 
to a more creative moment, when the “old” sentencing experts, judges, 
reexamine existing sentencing standards, and carve out common law 
 
58 See, e.g., United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 187 (2d Cir. 2010) (evaluating 
critically the child pornography Guidelines in the light of the statutory sentencing pur-
poses).  The court noted:   
This deference to the Guidelines is not absolute or even controlling; rather, 
like our review of many agency determinations, “[t]he weight of such a judg-
ment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in [the 
agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier 
and later pronouncements, all those factors which give it power to persuade, if 
lacking power to control.” 
Id. at 188 (alterations in original) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 
(1944)); cf. Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second Chance for Sentencing Reform:  Establishing 
a Sentencing Agency in the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN. L. REV. 217, 231 (2005) (recommend-
ing the creation of a new sentencing agency that would be subject to judicial review 
under the arbitrary and capricious standard).  
59 See, e.g., United States v. Garrison, 560 F. Supp. 2d 83, 89-91 (D. Mass. 2008) 
(comparing the case of one defendant to similarly situated defendants in the district).  
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rules alongside the Guidelines and the “new” experts, the Commission.  
The Commission did not do very well in clarifying and rationalizing  
sentencing; there is reason to believe that sentencing judges—with 
Guidelines, and sentencing opinions at both the appellate and district 
court levels—can do better.  Alphonse-Gaston no more.   
